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Consciousness, Perspective, Community 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to draw some contrasts between objects and conscious beings in order to provide 
an explanation of the emergence of consciousness. This contrast will show a source of differences 
between objects and conscious beings to arise from the interpretation of scenes in which each 
feature: the characterisation of scenes in which conscious agents are present exhibits interpretive 
complexities not seen in those comprised solely of objects. Interpretation itself will then be shown to 
be reliant upon the communicative potentials of a community. The difference consciousness makes 
will hereby be shown to be grounded in interpretations that rely upon communication communities, 
or more generally, in an account of points of view. The emergence of consciousness will thus be 
explained in terms of interpretation and community. 
Being Conscious 
If we ask, “What does a conscious being do?” we could expect answers like: thinks, feels, acts; Obeys 
the law; Observes cultural norms; socialises. These are all true and expected. Unexpected but true 
answers might include... well, what, exactly? Here is a difference in possible descriptions about 
objects versus conscious beings. An essential part of being conscious is having a constitutive role in 
the actions one enacts. To restate it: someone may try to catch a ball, but fall in a lake instead. Their 
report that they were trying to catch the ball cannot be ruled out as irrelevant by a third person's 
statement otherwise. 
Maintaining that 'falling in the lake' is the relevant action from a third-personal point of view does 
not do the same work in the face of the self-report as does such a report of an object. The 'trying to 
catch the ball' is inherently relevant to the falling in the lake. The experience of ‘a missed catch’ 
cannot be captured by any but a few physical descriptions of the scene. A third party's interest in 
lake-falling doesn't make the catch-effort irrelevant to the context. This is in contrast with discussing 
physical systems where such bracketing is often appropriate: if we are interested in the velocity of a 
projectile, its colour, smell, launch date etc. are ignored. Or again, for example, with a computational 
system, it is irrelevant whether the computer is realised in silicon, arrangements of valves, tin cans 
and string or any other material when we are simply interested in its output of, say, a correctly 
deduced conclusion from given premises. 
At the extreme, when considering scenes in which conscious beings are present, fixation with lake-
falling to the exclusion of catch-efforts misses something essential to the context. The intended 
action is bound up with the possibility of affording the error that is falling in the lake, as it is part of 
the articulable – the communicable – features of the scene. 
Before moving on to explore this problematic, it is worth summarising now the argument to follow 
in order to link this brief outline to the resources to be deployed subsequently. The general 
argument goes as follows: 
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1.) There is at least one significant difference in general between scenes that include conscious 
agents as opposed to those that do not. 
2.) The role of perspective is a significant difference. 
3.) Accounting for perspective relies upon an account of reasons. 
4.) Reasons are discerned via acts of interpretation. 
5.) Interpretations are linked closely with linguistic communication, as this is the storehouse par 
excellence for reasons. 
The idea is that this difference, one related to the role of perspective, accounts for the emergence of 
consciousness. What can be said about perspective is therefore held to say something about the 
emergence of consciousness, in this case that it is closely tied to reasons and their interpretation in 
action, especially communicative action.1 
Cognition and Computation 
According to Bruner (1990), a revolution that occurred within psychology has made it increasingly 
difficult to discuss consciousness without resort to a computational model. This model posits the 
mind as an information processor and designates its proper study as such. The emphasis upon 
information processing as opposed to meaning construction is, for Bruner, an unfortunate one that 
serves to obscure more than it reveals about consciousness. Agency is one particular area that was 
rendered problematic by this shift: 
“Cognitive scientists, in the main, have no quarrel with the idea that behaviour is directed, even 
directed toward goals. If direction is governed by the results of computing the utility of alternative 
outcomes, this is perfectly bearable and, indeed, is the centrepiece of 'rational choice theory'. But 
cognitive science in its new [computational] mood, despite all its hospitality toward goal-directed 
behavior, is still chary of a concept of agency. For 'agency' implies conduct under the sway of 
intentional states.” (Bruner 1990:9) 
In order to understand the computational position here being challenged, it is important to see what 
computational systems might be. Following Fodor, as discussed by Taylor (1983:148), we can see a 
system as computational if: 
1.) we can map physical states of that system onto the formulae of a reductive language 
2.) we can relate prior states of the system (causally, functionally or otherwise) to subsequent states 
using the rules of that reductive language to model the states 
We can then describe, report, predict – capture the purportedly computational nature of the system 
– thanks to the language and the model. 
                                                          
1 Throughout this piece, ‘action’ is taken as behaviour based in reasoning, as opposed to reaction which may 
be simply caused. Communicative action is the apogee of such action as it is both a product of reasoned action 
- 3 - 
In the case of understanding how objects relate to one another in various scenes this strategy is 
generalisable: we can represent objects to ourselves in different ways according to what features 
strike us as salient. We can then model the relations between these states according to adequate 
descriptions (i.e. map states to a reductive language.) Thus we can theorise about the world around 
us, predict, report and so on about its antics. For instance, where we discuss physical systems we can 
use various reductions to the language of physics, such as frictionless planes, point masses, wave 
superpositions and so on. We can then make a theory of the scene at hand and understand it as a 
physical system. 
This approach loses plausibility when it comes to scenes that include conscious beings (cf. Taylor Loc. 
Cit.) By way of illustration, it seems important that the 'trying' in a person's trying to pass their 
driving test, but crashing into a lamp-post, is constitutive of the scene in a non-trivial way. It is 
significantly different to a scenario in which an empty car's brakes fail and it simply rolls into a lamp-
post. A conscious being’s own accounts of what they are doing seem non-trivially to constitute at 
least some aspects of the scenes in which those beings are present. It is unclear how an information-
processing reduction can account for this. It is unclear as the information in a scene involving 
conscious beings includes meaningfulness from a point of view, or intentional content. From these 
sorts of considerations come Bruner's concern above about the removal of agency on a 
computational model. 
At least two issues come from this that will bear further scrutiny. Firstly, it seems that discussions of 
objects can be carried out relatively unproblematically from a third-personal point of view, and 
according to prior interests. Secondly, where conscious beings are present, it seems that first-
person-constructed meaning in part determines the scene. 
On the one hand, the argument suggests that there is nothing intrinsic to a system that determines 
its meaningfulness. On the other, self-consciousness appears to be an intrinsically relevant feature of 
systems qua scenarios in which conscious beings are present. This seems at least in tension, at worst 
a contradiction. The material world of inanimate objects behaves in certain ways owing to 
deterministic laws of nature to which we can reduce our descriptions, but human beings can act in 
ways not readily captured by any particular reduction. This perhaps nods at least to a Kantian notion 
of freedom wherein human beings can act according to laws other than these 'merely' causal ways 
(Kant 1898:117). This also introduces, however, a note of mysterianism, or the idea that 
consciousness introduces something ‘other’ to a scene that could otherwise be understood simply. 
A way through these issues comes via the notion of interpretation. Having first discussed Putnam 
(1981) and his ‘brains in vats’, the argument will go that if we rely upon the idea of interpretation, 
both the contingency of objective descriptions and the seemingly essential role of consciousness to a 
scene will be clarified. The upshot will be that we are given some basis for the view that perspective 
is important where conscious beings are present, and that interpretation is always relative to a 
perspective. Following from this, the argument will go on to see how reasons and reasoning feature 
in understanding or accounting for this perspectivally-rich picture. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and a means of overtly presenting the reasoning. The presentation of the basis for these views is out of scope. 
See for instance Brandom (1998) or Habermas (2004) 
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'Internal Realism' 
Putnam (1981) scrutinises the nature of reference – the nature of how we might pick out objects in 
the world – in the light of representation. A common view of how objects in the world have meaning 
for us is that we represent them in our minds, perhaps as a picture or proposition of some kind. 
Having discussed five scenarios wherein the role of representations regarding reference is 
problematised (1981:1ff), Putnam goes on to set up and then discount the Cartesian demon-esque, 
sceptical conceit of the ‘brain in the vat’. 
According to this thought experiment, a population has its entire reality fed directly into its nervous 
systems via a supercomputer. Thus, what for us would be reality merely seems to be so for those in 
the vats, their entire reality being merely an interactive computer-generated image. Putnam seeks 
to undermine the possibility of this scenario by showing it to be self-refuting. We are asked to 
consider what is going on when a vat-dweller utters, ‘there is a tree in front of me’. The statement 
may well be true for the utterer, but so in vat-English. What is referred to in the vat-language is a 
tree-in-the-image, even though they don’t know it is an image. In fact, supposing the vat-dweller to 
have been in the image since birth, they could not refer to real, actual trees as could someone from 
the real world. They could never have been in any relation whatsoever to such things. They have 
only ever been in any kind of relation to things-in-the-image. 
Next, we are supposed to consider whether we could really be brains in vats, or rather, what is going 
on when a vat-dweller says, ‘I am a brain in a vat’. Since the ‘brains’ and the ‘vats’ to which utterers 
so placed can refer are brains and vats in the image, and since the image presents itself as a reality, 
the utterer of such a statement can only mean that they are brains in vats in the image. Owing to the 
nature of the image, this is not the case; those in the image are presented with a world qualitatively 
identical with ours. Thus, if we are brains in vats (actual, real brains in actual, real vats) subject to the 
illusion that we are normal human beings going about our normal lives as given by the image, then 
the statement ‘we are brains in vats’ is false. Thus, the statement ‘we are brains in vats’ can only be 
false. The brain in the vat hypothesis is ‘...in a certain way, self-refuting.’ (1981:7) 
This refutation of the sceptical hypothesis challenges views of reference regarding the role of 
resemblance and intentionality; what’s ‘in the head’ can’t determine once and for all the 
meaningfulness of any given scene. Elsewhere, Putnam (1992:18) describes this kind of position in 
terms of there being no ‘God’s Eye View’, a view from which a final description of the world could 
emanate. The interpretation of a scene, bounded by theoretical (linguistic) possibility, is an essential 
part of making sense of that scene. 
The relevance of this discussion to the present argument is in terms of the limits imposed by 
language upon the possibilities of reference that Putnam establishes – there is no general reductive 
language into which talk about the world may be transformed: ‘tree’ versus ‘tree-in-the-image’ is a 
significant difference, but one not universally discernible owing to the practical relations in which 
speakers and the spoken about must be. In Putnam’s words, ‘Thought words and mental pictures do 
not intrinsically represent what they are about.’ (1981:5) 
An account such as Putnam’s can be seen as underlying the notion that suggests self-consciousness 
is constitutive of a system wherein a conscious being is present – In an agent's perception of any 
object as having some quality, it is always already implied that the recognition of the possibilities for 
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recognising and utilising that quality are somehow associated with that object. One might, for 
instance, see a ball as 'catchable'. But a ball's catchability will vary across dimensions such as 
physical ability, confidence, the rules of a game that might be being played (e.g. the ball is physically 
catchable, but this is football and I'm not in goal, so really I cannot catch it). My trying to catch a ball 
and my possible failure will cluster around a great many factors, each of which the product of intra- 
and inter- personally evaluable judgement. This presents us with a seemingly necessary role for: 
a.) points of view 
and 
b.) prior theory in understanding descriptions of a scene 
Just as the vat-dweller can’t speak of trees apart from in the image, nor can any agent speak for 
themselves outside of a particularly structured perspective. The ways in which I may see the ball as 
catchable are structured by factors to do with my perspective. To put in generally, to see any object 
as having some quality, to see x as Q, is to judge it so. Such a perception is equal to a judgement – 
when we represent x to ourselves as Q-able this is at least in part because we judge that x under 
suitable descriptions can be Qd.2 
However it should be apparent that such judgements cannot be readily subsumed under an 
information processing rubric. There is no ‘God’s Eye View’ from which theory-free information can 
be discerned and then layered with postulates. In other words when we judge that ‘x under suitable 
descriptions can be Qd’, the '...under suitable descriptions' part is up for grabs. 
When conscious beings are involved, interpretation is too. Against mysterianism, however, Putnam’s 
arguments also make clear that nothing ‘in the head’ is doing strange work in rendering the scene 
what it is. In fact, Putnam’s position seems to orient the locus of consciousness from 'inside the 
head' to linguistic activity in the external world – without a ‘God’s Eye View’ we must rely on our 
own sub-lunar abilities. 
Consonant with Putnam’s account of the role of language in setting limits on the possibility of 
reference, Davidson (2001) argues further that it is only once a group can communicate that any 
sense can be made of points of view at all. From this it can be argued that communication 
underwrites the evaluation of one description over another. This in turn suggests that before one 
can begin considering objects, consciousness, oneself, another or agency, oneself and the other at 
least are always already presupposed. Self conscious perspective, in other words, requires an 
account of community. 
The judgement that ‘the system computes,’ or ‘the driver crashed,’ 'the ball was well caught' or that 
‘x can be Qd,’ runs on the basis that such a judgement may be communicated to another. 
Consciousness, it emerges, requires an account of self-conscious perspective that is itself reliant 
upon the communicative potentials of a community. This will require considerable unpacking as a lot 
has come out in quick succession. In order to set about this unpacking, it will be useful to turn to 
Brandom (1998) as his account of persons as 'concept-mongers' (1998:xi, 8, 172) relies upon rules 
and interpersonal action. As such, it stands as good ground from which we might make progress. 
                                                          
2 This sort of thinking is explored in Nanay (2012) 
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Perspective as a Place Within Reasoning 
The account coming from Putnam has it that reference is bounded by linguistic possibility. Language, 
though, is public and is a rule-centred activity. If intentionality isn't to be thought of as eclipsing 
consciousness in general, then more needs to be said about context relevance. What will emerge is 
an account of how self-consciousness and communication operate by navigating a ‘space of 
reasons’.3 
Brandom’s (1998) account of communication centres upon the idea that through scrutinising 
inferences made in linguistic communication via a kind of ‘scorekeeping mechanism’ understanding 
can be achieved and monitored among a group of interlocutors. By keeping track on the discursive 
commitments and entitlements of ourselves and our conversational partners, we can come to an 
understanding of one another’s perspectives. For instance, if I suggest to an interlocutor that Mary is 
in the garden, I am committed to the further claim that Mary is not in the ocean. Moreover, I feel 
entitled to pronounce on her whereabouts owing to, say, having seen her there. So in my claim 
about Mary’s location, I exhibit something of my perspective in being correctly informed and tied to 
certain information and consequences. 
To put it more generally, interlocutors A and B communicate when a claim p undertaken by A 
becomes available to B in her inferential system. B understands A’s claim if B attributes the right 
commitment to A as a result of A’s utterance. A necessary condition for B’s understanding of A’s 
utterance is for B to know the consequences of endorsing the claim herself, i.e. B must be able to 
assess the inferential significance of p relative to her commitment set. Communication requires that 
B must be able to select a sentence that would have the same or closely comparable inferential 
significance relative to her commitment set as A’s utterance has relative to his.4 
Reasoning about actual communicative practices provides us with a critical means of understanding 
one another. This is based in a kind of reconstruction of communication as a set of inferential 
practices. We can understand an interlocutor’s perspective provide the means to reconstruct 
conceptual content: conceptual content is identified with inferential role. (ibid:619) This materiality 
of the inferential constellation in play is important as, unlike standard logical inferences, material 
inference utilises the content of the concept invoked in a predicate. For example, if I am to claim 
that Belfast is south-east of Derry, I am committed to the sentence ‘The Maiden City is north-west of 
the Titanic’s birthplace’. Such an inference uses the conceptual content of the concepts at play. 
So the inferential constellation in play is related via language to rich knowledge that could include 
logical, physical, linguistic, practical laws and self-knowledge. This last factor is important. It is the 
‘can I φ?’ of ‘have I got it in me to φ?’ where 'φ' is some action. Overcoming character flaws, 
supererogatory actions, self-effacing behaviour etc. are relevant in assessing one's ability to φ. These 
factors, indeed, can effectively trump others in practice, i.e. excessive humility may prevent a 
logically and physically action from being carried out. This highlights an essential characteristic of 
self-consciousness as an interesting case of consciousness more generally. It is worth dwelling a little 
                                                          
3  This phrase comes from Wilfrid Sellars (1997) 
4 The clarity of this summary is owed to Kevin Scharp (2003) 
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longer on this notion of 'Can I φ?' in order to nail down the pragmatic aspects of the discussion at 
hand. 
In perceiving any object as having some quality (x as Q) it is always already implied that the 
recognition of the possibilities for Q-ing are present in x. This means that we employ beliefs, desires 
and values in order to ground hypothetical modal statements of the form “Possibly If x then Q”. This 
is like saying to oneself “The ball is catchable.” It means that there are reasons to believe it can be 
caught (e.g. it’s not moving too fast, we aren’t playing a game in which handling the ball is 
prohibited, etc.) Perceiving Q-ability is thus related to belief, desire, value and experience via 
judgement – the judgement that is equal to the perception is an association between x, one’s own 
knowledge, and possible outcomes based in their conjunction. 
Representing x as Q-able is not a matter of picturing, but a matter of associating x with a sphere of 
reasoning. Perceiving x as Q-able is related to reasons – it has to be as Q-ing x will be an action φ and 
so must be differentiated from mere movements or reflexes by issuing from a reason base. The 
reasons in the case of Q-ability are themselves the contents of predicates construed as material 
inferences in association with the modes of knowledge just expressed (logical, physical, technical, 
practical and self). 
This doesn’t have to be a conscious representation of x as Q-able: the other way around – x can be 
represented as Q-able consciously in virtue of its being judged as located in a perception of x, one’s 
own knowledge, and possible outcomes based in their conjunction. Conscious decisions about x are 
made on this basis, not as the foundation of this basis. The judgement is the perception and it 
structures possibilities of φ-ing for the agent in advance. 
This mirrors a broadly empiricist intuition that objects both precede and constitute perceptual 
experiences. What it goes beyond, however, is the notion that consciousness is exhausted by 
intentional thought. It does this by identifying the connections between consciousness and practical 
action as a nexus of judgements based in points of view. So the question now is; how does this 
identification of connections proceed? The brief answer to be proposed is: via interpretation. Indeed, 
it will transpire that interpretation and consciousness are linked in a fundamental way. 
Interpreting Reasons 
It has thus far been maintained that consciousness is bound up with the possibilities of interpreting a 
scene and discerning reasons in communication in some sense. Self-consciousness appears to be an 
intrinsically relevant feature of scenarios in which conscious beings are present. Putnam showed 
that there was no “God’s eye view”, and that language was a limiting factor in describing 
experiences. By extension, where there is no Archimedean viewpoint, perspective must be taken 
seriously in the characterisation of any given scene. This is accounted for in Brandom owing to the 
nature of the communicative endeavour. Communication, in this context, is concerned with what 
may be said and concluded are what may be relied upon as reasons are determined by the 
commitments and entitlements I have, as given by the meaningful utterances I make. In terms of a 
pragmatic theory of linguistic communication, this communicative model is supposed to help 
capture the real proprieties that are embedded in actual language use among speakers, “…what 
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moves are appropriate given a certain score, and what difference those moves make to that score”. 
(Brandom 1998:180-186) 
The point here is that via interpretation, answers can be gained to the question from above: what 
does a conscious being do? In being based in an interpretation, rather than a computable reduction 
to a pre-given language, these answers are based in the evaluation of perspectives. Such 
perspectives are the point of reference for reasoned actions, typified by communication. To return 
to an ongoing example, understanding a fall into a lake as a missed catch means constructing the 
perspective of the catcher-in-the-lake. This means construing that catcher's predicament as bound 
up with the confidence that the ball is catchable, hence with an articulable set of material 
commitments and entitlements. For instance, that no rules of a game being played precluded the 
entitlement to catch the ball; that catching the ball would lead to having the ball and this state is 
acceptable. 
This interpreting of reasons and the role of perspective are important differences between the non-
conscious and the conscious: in being practically construed in terms of the evaluation of practical 
actions in contexts, it sidesteps mysterianism. The emergence of consciousness is seen in the 
practice, not in the gaining of a peculiar quality. What remains, however, is the tension between 
first-person reports of actions and third person evaluations of action. The stakes here are the scopes 
of 'intentionality' and 'consciousness'. 
The Locus of Reasons and Intentions 
The idea that intention must figure in accounting for communicative meaning as it is speakers’ 
intentions that determine what interpretation of an ambiguous sentence is meant to be taken up by 
an audience. However, upon looking at H. P. Grice’s account through Richard Heck’s analysis, 
reasons can be seen to inhabit communicatively used language itself, and so one could see reasons 
for understanding one’s interlocutors in their speech actions themselves without necessary recourse 
to divining mysterious intentions. This Heckian modification of Grice urges the interpretive account 
of communicative understanding. Interpretation is a key part of the story of communicative 
meaning. Such an account results in ad hoc, context sensitive theories being constructed for one’s 
interlocutors. Thus ambiguity is ubiquitous in communication in the sense that the the fixity of 
meaning as conceived along Platonic or Fregean lines is replaced with the plasticity of ongoing 
interpretive encounters. That communicative understanding is ubiquitous also urges an 
understanding of conscious beings as essentially interpretive beings.5 
The kind of phenomena for which Gricean (1991) analysis seems particularly appropriate are those 
where one can mean more, or other, than what one literally says. One famous example is that of a 
professor’s reference letter for a student. We are asked to suppose the professor writes of the 
student something like: “Jones is punctual and has neat handwriting.” 
                                                          
5
 Recall that language is a species of action in general and so one needn’t be linguistic to be an actor. Animals 
etc. can act. For the purposes of this argument, communicative action is the focus owing to its richness in 
exhibiting and expressing reasoning. Moreover action other than communicative action can, for a linguistic 
actor, be explained in language. 
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In writing such a sentence as an academic reference, the professor clearly gives his opinion of the 
student’s unremarkable academic abilities but doesn’t actually say anything about them. This 
unspoken but clear meaning is an ‘implicature’. On an account of linguistic understanding that relies 
purely upon syntax and word meanings, a contents-and-connectives view, such things are hard or 
impossible to account for. On such an account the professor has simply praised the student’s time-
keeping and penmanship. As capable speakers we know there is more going on than just this. More 
is being communicated than is said but this something more needs accounted for. 
Grice assumes that there is a cooperative principle underlying communicative practice (1991:22-40) 
This principle characterises the communicative exchange as a cooperative endeavour among 
interlocutors with a loosely defined purpose of sharing information. This assumption of a general 
loosely defined purpose to communication serves to set apart communication from random 
mumblings among groups of people. It also characterises it as a rational activity. Richard Heck 
regards this as the defining feature of Grice’s project: “The core idea is thus that speech is a rational 
activity: everything else Grice says is, in effect, by way of elaborating or developing this core idea.” 
(2006:25) 
On the assumption that communication is a rational endeavour, furthermore, such phenomena as 
the professor’s letter can be explained. Given broad expectations regarding quality, quantity, 
relevance and manner within a talk-exchange, to use Grice’s terminology, utterances can convey 
more or other than what they literally say either by fulfilling or subverting those expectations. For 
instance, the expectations surrounding the professor’s reference are not fulfilled which raises an 
obvious ‘why?’ for the reader of the letter, i.e. why, given all the normal expectations surrounding 
an academic reference letter, would a reasonable person fail to meet them? For Grice the answer is 
revealed through his obvious omissions what he really has on his mind about the student and the 
capable interlocutor picks this up. 
Heck departs from Grice’s account of implicatures and suggests his own treatment of linguistic 
understanding that is reliant upon a more basic notion than Grice’s. The difference between Grice 
and Heck is in the emphasis each puts upon communicative intentions. For Grice, communicative 
intentions are ultimately the source of speakers’ meanings, hence determine communicated 
meaning. Grice’s account has it that a speaker communicates something by having a complex of 
intentions recognised by an audience that conveys the speaker’s meaning, though this meaning may 
be very different from what the words in order apparently mean. But however one fleshes out the 
story behind the professor’s reasons for not fulfilling expectations, they all share a common starting 
point: one cannot even raise the question as to why he has failed to fulfil expectations unless one 
assumes the professor to have been trying to do something in his writing what he did. That is, unless 
his so doing was considered as a doing, one of his volition and intentional under propositional 
descriptions no prospect of analysis in terms of meaning would arise. The writing of the letter must 
be apt to be thought of as an act of saying that p, and so, as an action it must be considered to be 
based on reasons. 
Heck’s point against Grice is that implicatures can be made without the specific communicative 
intentions Grice supposes to be necessary. Implicatures can be made adventitiously, as it were, and 
be quite independent of the general purpose of a particular talk-exchange or a particular meaning of 
an utterance. The point Heck argues for is that there is a more basic notion underlying accounts of 
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linguistic understanding than that of speakers’ communicative intentions, namely the notion of the 
rationality of speech. His idea is that the reality of communication among speakers is a phenomenon 
like many others in that we rationalise the speech actions of others, which amounts to discerning 
why they act as they do; we interpret one another as acting for reasons, and in communication this 
is no different. Communicative intentions of the sort Grice relies upon are a real part of 
communication but, following Heck, they can be effective on the basis of the more fundamental 
reasonableness of linguistic communication itself, i.e. one can form communicative intentions and 
mean something on that basis, but one has one’s communicative intentions recognised by relying 
upon the reasonableness of communicative practices. 
Heck’s claim is that the real phenomenon of meaning what one does not literally say is a special case 
of a phenomenon for which the propositional rationality of speech is chiefly responsible; 
“The basic notion here… is a weak notion of implicature that does not require one to have any 
communicative intentions regarding what proposition is implicated: these propositions are ones the 
audience can conclude the speaker believes on the basis of an inference to the best explanation 
concerning her specific act of saying what she did; it makes no sense for me to have said that p 
specifically, in this context, unless I believe that q; my saying that p therefore implicates that q, in 
this weak sense. Meaning something one does not say is a less fundamental notion: meaning, in this 
sense – and so implicature in Grice’s sense – is implicating something, in my weak sense, plus having 
the appropriate communicative intentions.” (2006:28) 
Communication, on Heck’s account, proceeds upon the basis of a general cooperative practice that 
presumes interlocutors to be engaged in a mutual and rational linguistic endeavour. Heck 
emphasises the point that in understanding someone it is difficult to account for understanding 
them as meaning that p in uttering as they do without central reference to the idea of them saying 
that p, i.e. without reference to the fact that one’s interlocutor is doing something in uttering. Any 
instance of communicative language use must be thought of as intentional under at least a 
propositional description, i.e. as an act of saying that p, of deploying sense-bearing sentences. Thus, 
language use in general can’t be thought of without reference to language users’ cognitive contents, 
and can’t be detached from the actions of a rational agent without thereby rendering it 
unintelligible. 
 “If speaking is acting, one’s saying what one does is as much a function of one’s various beliefs and 
desires as anything else that one does. Others will therefore frequently be able to draw conclusions 
about what one believes (or does not believe), or wants (or does not want), from what one says (or 
does not say), in much the same way, and for much the same reason, that they are able to make 
such discoveries by considering other things one does (or fails to do).” (2006:29) 
Heck goes on to characterise humans in general as self-consciously interpretive beings and suggests 
that the process outlined here proceeds owing to this fact. We suppose others to act for reasons just 
as we act for reasons, and so in the speech of others we discern reasons (beliefs and desires inter 
alia) for their speech-actions (or omissions). What this looks like motivating is a model of 
communicative meaning in which what counts is mutual recognition between speaker and audience 
of deliberate communicative acts by means of taking part in a generally rational practice of 
interpersonal speech. 
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Communicative meaning isn’t an expression of something psychological by means of a linguistic 
instrument. Grice’s account suggested that understanding communicated meanings amounted to 
divining complex intentions in our interlocutors. Heck gives the means to go beyond this, with his 
account, to account for understanding communication in terms of the language used in 
communication owing to its rational nature, i.e. we apprehend an interlocutor’s reasons, present in 
their utterances qua speech-actions. In fact, intention too can be accounted for in this way. 
The interpretation of action in a communicative context is taken as a mutual endeavour among 
interlocutors. Communicative action is thus a space of reasons in which one locates oneself and 
one’s interlocutors as perspectives in a scene. Saying something is doing something, in the sense 
that one has expectations about the intentions of one’s interlocutors to make a difference with their 
verbal interventions. But the mechanism that runs the communicative exchange is an interpretive 
one and is aimed at constructing the perspective of the other via getting a handle on the reasons 
they can have for the utterances they make. 
Conclusion 
One can, and probably usually does have intentions regarding the beliefs and actions of one’s 
interlocutors, but these intentions are discernible within the language as practice. What an 
interlocutor may or may not do with an utterance seems up to them; they could perfectly well 
understand an utterance such as ‘Could you close the door?’ as a request and not an enquiry, hence 
as you wanting them to close a door, but simply refuse. The audience can know the conditions of 
your speech act’s performance, i.e. recognise what it is you’re doing in performing it but decide not 
to react as you intend. In this refusal, your meaning is not changed. Understanding, not elicited 
response seems centrally important. 
On analysing linguistic communicative practice it seems that matters of meaning are much more 
fluid and context sensitive than might be thought. Communicating isn't a simple matter of 
transmitting and receiving clear, unambiguous messages. Stated extremely, each communicative 
encounter is in principle unique. However, given the ease with which communicative practices yield 
mutual intelligibility and understanding, one common factor must be the role of communicator qua 
interpretive being. So it seems that through an examination of familiar practices of communication 
we yield an unfamiliar picture of those practices, one seemingly full of potential chaos. Nonetheless, 
that picture can be understood in such a way as to have interesting implications for human self-
understanding. 
Bruner’s fear was that ‘thinkable is like computable’ had morphed via a reduction within 
psychological thinking into ‘computable equals thinkable.’ This had led to an unfortunate 
identification between computation and consciousness. What was lost in this reduction was the 
sense in which conscious beings are creators and manipulators of meaning rather than processors of 
information. 
Meaning-construction and information processing rely upon different concepts. The latter requires a 
strong sense in which neutral deductions and inferences are carried out against a background of 
uncontroversial assumptions. This is where computation comes in. The former is a less deterministic 
affair. In positing it as such, however, the risk is that we prompt flight into fancy. Putnam assured us 
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that interpretation was key and linked closely to language. There are no meaning-neutral 
assumptions that can be made such that a reduction to a fundamental language of some sort is 
possible. In a way, the limits of possibility are the limits of language, in Putnam’s account. Brandom 
provided a means through which to comprehend the role of perspective in this, how concepts as 
rules could figure in a public activity that mediates meaning among a group of interlocutors. 
Interpretation offers a general ‘engine’ as a means through which mutual understanding is made 
possible: the role of action based on reasons comes to the fore where meaningfulness must be 
ascribed to others (and oneself). Through Grice and Heck it was determined that reasons needn’t be 
considered to be mysterious, as the public activity of language itself houses reasons. In fact, 
following Heck, language was also seen to be a repository for intentions. This means that in 
interpretation we can ascribe reasons and intentions to one another such that we can come to a 
view of one another’s self-conscious perspective. This is essential given the importance placed upon 
‘meaning construction’ for conscious beings. Using these resources we can without mysterianism 
account for how someone’s perspective, such as their trying to catch a ball is an intrinsic part of the 
scene. 
The emergence of consciousness requires a space of reasons that structures perspectives on action. 
These perspectives themselves are linked to actions via their communicability. We can understand 
systems, physical, intentional or otherwise construed, as a function of our ability to interpret them. 
We can interpret them according to our available schemes of description, evaluation, analysis etc., 
our language. Where we have a scene comprised solely of objects, prior interests or partial interests 
can specify that scene to a satisfactory degree. Where we have conscious beings, however, part of 
the scene involves their perspective on that very scene. ‘Their perspective’ is a group of reasons that 
explain action in that scene. In order to specify this to any satisfactory degree, we must look for 
these reasons, and do so in communication. Thus we see that consciousness, perspective and 
community each bleed into one another. Each has relevance to how objects and conscious beings 
differ, in terms of how self-conscious perspective makes a scene irreducible to a neutral description. 
Accounting for such perspectives requires essential reference to reasons and intentions, and so to 
the communicative potential of a public. 
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